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INTRODUCTION
On September 23, 2010, Teresa Lewis became the first woman to
be executed in Virginia in nearly a century.' As individuals at Greens-
ville Correctional Center inserted intravenous lines into Lewis's arms,
she sang hymns.2 She offered her last words to her stepdaughter: "I
t A.B., Princeton University, 2008; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2013; Senior Notes Edi-
tor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 98. I give special thanks to Professor Keir Weyble for spark-
ing my interest in capital punishment law and guiding me to this topic. Additionally, thank
you to the wonderful Cornell Law Review members who shepherded my Note from selection
to publication, including Megan Easley, Saad Rizwan, Jane Bobet, Steven Madrid, and Sue
Pado. Finally, I am grateful to AndyJacobson for his good humor, support, and invaluable
edits.
I Editorial, A Woman Dies, AMERICA, Nov. 1, 2010, at 5.
2 Catie Beck, "I Watched a Woman Die": Eye-Witness Reveals Haunting First-Hand Account
of the Execution of Teresa Lewis, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Sept. 25, 2010, 7:58 AM), http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1314993/Teresa-Lewis-execution--watched-woman-die-One-
witness-hand-account.html.
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love you and I'm very sorry."3 Eighteen minutes later, she fell uncon-
scious and died from the chemicals lethally injected into her body.4
Eight years earlier, Teresa Lewis conspired with Matthew Shallen-
berger and Rodney Fuller to kill her husband, Julian Lewis, in a plot
to share the insurance benefits that Teresa would receive upon her
husband's death.5 Although the Lewis family was of modest means,
Julian had recently come into about $200,000 as the beneficiary of a
life insurance policy after one of his sons died in an automobile acci-
dent.6 Teresa met Shallenberger and Fuller in a retail store, and they
became friends.7 Shallenberger, looking for money to begin an illegal
drug operation, found a willing accomplice in Teresa.8 Soon, the
three prepared to killJulian; Teresa withdrew cash and gave it to Shal-
lenberger and Fuller to purchase firearms and ammunition.9 Early on
October 30, 2002, Shallenberger and Fuller entered the Lewis home
and shot and killed Julian and his son, Charles.10 Teresa waited forty-
five minutes before calling emergency responders to report that an
intruder had killed her husband and stepson." Authorities suspected
Teresa's involvement, and about one week later she confessed to po-
lice that she had offered Shallenberger money to kill her husband.12
Law enforcement arrested Teresa, Shallenberger, and Fuller and
charged them with capital murder and other criminal offenses.13
Each of the defendants pled guilty to the charged crimes. 14
Fuller immediately accepted a sentence of life without parole to testify
against Teresa and Shallenberger.15 Shallenberger initially went to
trial, but midtrial he entered a guilty plea.16 The trial judge also sen-
tenced Shallenberger to life, reasoning that his sentence should be
proportionate to that of Fuller, the other triggerman.17 After learning
that the prosecutor intended to seek the death penalty for Teresa
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Lewis v. Hobbs, 131 S. Ct. 59 (2010) (No.
10-5692), 2010 WL 3740551, at *7-8. This description of the events is per the prosecu-
tion's presentation of evidence and is taken as true given Lewis's guilty plea. See id. at 7-9,
2010 WL 3740551, at *7-9.
6 See Lewis v. Virginia, 593 S.E.2d 220, 222 (Va. 2004); cf Editorial, supra note 1
(suggesting that Lewis was unable to afford her own attorney).
7 Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 222.
8 SeeJohn Grisham, Why Is Teresa Lewis on Death Row?, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2010, at
B5.
9 See Lewis, 593 S.E.2d at 223.
10 See id. at 223-24.
11 Id. at 223.
12 Id. at 224.
13 See Grisham, supra note 8.
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 10, 2010 WL 3740551, at *10.
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under a theory that Teresa was the "mastermind" of the murders, her
trial counsel encouraged her to accept responsibility and plead
guilty.1 8 Teresa's counsel most likely calculated that the trial judge
would not sentence her to death. Fuller had recently received a sen-
tence of life without parole after pleading guilty before the same
judge, Teresa had accepted full responsibility and cooperated with au-
thorities, and Teresa's gender seemed to work in her favor (Virginia
had not executed a woman since 1912).19
At sentencing, however, the judge found that Lewis's conduct dis-
played "vileness . . . because her acts reflected a depravity of mind."2 0
This factual finding established an aggravator, making Teresa death
eligible under Virginia law.2 1 Following this finding, the judge sen-
tenced Lewis to death, explaining that "as the 'head of this serpent,'"
Teresa's culpability outweighed that of her accomplices.22 After eight
years of appeals and a denied stay from Virginia Governor Robert Mc-
Donnell and the Supreme Court, the State of Virginia executed Te-
resa.23 During this time, Shallenberger committed suicide in prison,
while Fuller continued to serve his life sentence. 24
The Lewis case illustrates a problem inherent in Virginia's capital
punishment scheme and a question that arises in capital sentencing in
general: Should guilty pleas automatically lead to judge sentencing,
and does such automatic judge sentencing violate the defendant's
Sixth Amendment jury right? Historically, the American criminal jus-
tice system has encouraged guilty pleas. Plea deals allow for quick
disposition of criminal cases and in exchange provide defendants with
more favorable sentences for acknowledging and taking responsibility
18 Id. at 8-10, 2010 WL 3740551, at *8-10. Virginia is one of the few states to have a
"triggerman" rule associated with its death penalty scheme. The triggerman rule requires
that a capital defendant actually be the person who killed the victim; codefendants in fel-
ony murders are not eligible for capital murder. The Virginia statute prescribing this trig-
german rule contains an exception, however, for defendants charged as masterminds in
murders for hire. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(2) (2009); Wrong Direction for Death Penalty,
VIRGINIAN PILOT, Feb. 1, 2011, at B8 (citing Lewis's case as a notable exception to the
triggerman rule).
19 See Grisham, supra note 8.
20 See Lewis v. Virginia, 593 S.E.2d 220, 222 (Va. 2004). The trial court made these
findings in a postsentencing hearing to clarify the original sentence imposing death. See id.
21 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 13, 2010 WL 3740551, at *13.
22 Id.
23 See Editorial, supra note 1 (describing the efforts Lewis's attorney and supporters
undertook from 2002 to 2010 to overturn the death sentence). In the Supreme Court
order, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor excepted that they would have
granted Lewis a stay but provided no insight as to why. Lewis v. Hobbs, 131 S. Ct. 59 (2010)
(order denying certiorari).
24 See Grisham, supra note 8.
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for their guilt.2 5 The Supreme Court recently affirmed the impor-
tance of the plea bargain when it held that a criminal defendant is
entitled to effective assistance of counsel in plea negotiations. 26
Although the stakes of plea bargaining are weighty in all criminal
cases, they are particularly high in capital murder cases. Pleading
guilty in multidefendant cases can create a "race" to the prosecutor's
office to cooperate and ensure the best sentence possible for the indi-
vidual defendant at the expense of the other defendants. 27 While tak-
ing responsibility for one's actions should serve as a mitigating factor,
it can be used to pit defendants against one another.
Defendants who plead guilty to murder in Virginia place their
sentences at the trial judge's discretion; the default procedure after a
guilty plea requires the trial judge to determine death eligibility and
selection.28 Recent Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New
Jersey'9 and Ring v. Arizonaso affirmed the capital defendant's right to a
jury determination of death eligibility. Yet defendants who plead
guilty in Virginia often unknowingly waive this right.31 Teresa Lewis's
trial counsel advised her: "[I]f you plead guilty the Judge and not a
jury will sentence you," and neither her counsel nor the court men-
tioned her right to a jury determination of death eligibility at any
time. 32
Virginia's capital sentencing scheme deprives defendants of their
fundamental right to ajury determination of death eligibility. Capital
defendants should be able to plead guilty and accept responsibility for
their actions and also take full advantage of the Sixth Amendment
right to ajury determination of death eligibility-or at least knowingly
waive that right. This Note explores the rights of capital defendants at
sentencing in the United States and Virginia, ultimately concluding
that a defendant who pleads guilty should be afforded ajury to deter-
25 See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) ("[T]he guilty plea and the . . .
plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly
administered, they can benefit all concerned.").
26 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) ("The reality is that plea bargains
have become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met
to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the
criminal process at critical stages.").
27 Cf Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375, 410-11 (1994) ("[A]n
examination of the system as it actually operates suggests that . . . the most important
function of the death penalty may be to facilitate prosecutors' efforts to induce guilty
pleas." (quoting WELSH S. WHIE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES 46-47 (1987))).
28 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 24-26, 2010 WL 3740551, at
*24-26.
29 530 U.S. 466, 496-97 (2000).
30 536 U.S. 584, 607-09 (2002).
31 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 14, 2010 WL 3740551, at *14.
32 Id. at 11, 2010 WL 3740551, at *11.
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mine death eligibility and selection. This Note uniquely advances re-
cent scholarship by confronting the particular issue of defendants
unknowingly waiving their right to ajury. A severe procedural penalty
is embedded in statutes that do not outright deny a defendant a right
but rather allow a judge to shuffle a defendant through the system
without knowledge of the right to a penalty-phase jury. Part I explores
the development and current state of constitutional requirements for
capital sentencing in the United States and the modern approach to
jury sentencing. Part II describes problems facing defendants who
plead guilty to murder in death penalty jurisdictions. Part III particu-
larizes this problem to Virginia's death penalty scheme and offers po-
tential solutions to the issue presented.
I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SixTH AMENDMENT JURY RIGHT
AT SENTENCING33
A. The Historical Right to Jury Sentencing
Death penalty sentencing often departs from traditional criminal
sentencing because of the foundational notion in American death
penalty jurisprudence that "death is different."34 The Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees all criminal defendants the right to a trial "by an
impartial jury."3 5 More specifically, the Sixth Amendment entitles all
criminal defendants to a jury for the fact-finding, guilt-determination
stage of their trial, and judges retain final discretion for sentencing
determinations.3 6 A jury conviction at the fact-finding stage is consti-
tutionally sufficient; juries are considered "unnecessary or untrustwor-
33 Throughout this Part, I will provide an overview of jury sentencing. For purposes
of simplicity, where background information discusses death penalty sentencing, I have
collapsed death eligibility and death selection into one sentencing determination. The
factors are equally relevant to death eligibility, which is the thrust of the analysis in Part III.
34 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, &
Stevens, JJ.) (noting that "the penalty of death is different in kind from any other punish-
ment" and emphasizing its "uniqueness"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind."); James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Beyond
Human Ability? The Rise and Fall of Death Penalty Legislation, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE
PENAL SANCTION 85, 105 (ames R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003).
35 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial has been incor-
porated against the states, although the specific characteristics of the jury have not been
defined. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-62 (1968).
36 See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 953-54 (2003)
(highlighting the paradox of the American justice system that ajury determines civil dam-
ages but not criminal sentences for noncapital cases); cf United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 226-27 (2005) (holding that judges may not impose sentences greater than those
justified by facts found beyond a reasonable doubt by ajury or admitted by the defendant).
A few states do still use juries for noncapital sentencing, but many commentators in these
states urge change. See Hoffman, supra, at 955 & n.8.
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thy" in noncapital sentencing.37 The Supreme Court has held that
criminal defendants have no constitutional right to a jury sentenc-
ing.38 Theoretically, this holding allows for individual determinations
of an offender's unique circumstances, maximizing the deterrent and
retributive values of punishment.39
Most capital sentencing schemes nevertheless require a jury to
determine the sentence where a defendant potentially faces the death
penalty.4 0 Although the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the
penalty of death is so serious that it is inherently different and thus
should be vested in a jury, many states still entrust juries with sentenc-
ing for this very reason.41 Before Ring v. Arizona,42 juries determined
sentences in twenty-nine states and the federal system, while five states
vested sole sentencing discretion in judges, and the remaining four
states used a hybrid system of jury recommendations to a judge with
ultimate sentencing authority.43 Overwhelmingly, states rely on juries
for this important decision.
Historically, juries have been vital to capital sentencing. The jury
right at capital sentencing has its roots in the common law. From the
early thirteenth century to the colonial era, juries played an important
role in England's capital trials, with jurors serving as representatives of
the community as a whole.44 Professor Welsh White noted that
"[t]hroughout its history, the jury determined which homicide de-
fendants would be subject to capital punishment by making factual
determinations." 4 5 Although tensions sometimes developed between
the judge's and jury's respective powers to determine sentences at a
homicide trial, the defendant's right to a jury usually trumped the
judge's power.46
37 Hoffman, supra note 36, at 954.
38 See id. at 973-74 & nn.83-84 (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 451-52, 459
(1984)).
39 See Irving R. Kaufman, Sentencing: The Judge's Problem, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,Jan. 1960,
at 40, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/flashbks/death/kauf
man.htm (discussing the values one judge believes to be important when sentencing
felons).
40 See Acker & Lanier, supra note 34, at 105-06.
41 See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 461-63 (rejecting petitioner's argument that differences in
the death penalty require ajury sentencing); WilliamJ. Bowers et al., The Capital Sentencing
Decision: Guided Discretion, Reasoned Moral Judgment, or LegalFiction, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT
WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 34, at 413.
42 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
43 See Acker & Lanier, supra note 34, at 105-06.
44 See Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital Defen-
dant's Right toJury Trial; 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 5-11 (1989).
45 Id. at 10-11.
46 See id. at 8-10 (tracing the balance of power between judges and juries and citing
Bushell's Case, which had "become a landmark in expanding the province of the jury."
(quotingJohn H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 298
(1978))).
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Juries carry historical importance because the jury traditionally
represented the community's values and thus mitigated the harshness
of a punishment. William Blackstone argued in his Commentaries on the
Laws of England that the jury should maintain an important role in
fact-finding because "more is to be apprehended from the violence
and partiality of judges."47 As such, "the truth of every accusation . . .
should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve
of [the defendant's] equals and neighbours," despite any inconve-
niences a jury might entail.48 The Framers relied heavily on Black-
stone's writings, and at the time Congress adopted the Bill of Rights,
the jury's right to make factual determinations regarding which de-
fendants to punish with the death penalty was "unquestioned." 4 9
The jury provides a benefit in representing the community's val-
ues because it shields the defendant from the potential harms of
judge sentencing. In the eighteenth century, the danger of entrusting
a judge with sentencing arose from the "voice of higher authority"-
the king.5 0 Today, judges still present a danger, but they answer to a
different "higher authority"-the voters.5 1 In most states, judges are
popularly elected. 52 Even though voters understand that judges pre-
side over a variety of criminal and civil matters, voters pay dispropor-
tionate attention to a judge's record on criminal cases.53 Criminal
cases, and especially capital cases, have the most visibility and seem to
have the most direct impact on a voter's life. 5 4 As could be expected,
the visibility of capital cases is even greater in smaller communities.
Popular support for the death penalty creates an incentive for popu-
larly elected judges to pander to the electorate's political positions; a
judge can cite number of death sentences in campaign advertisements
as evidence of the judge's so-called tough-on-crime record.5 5
47 Id. at 10 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *343).
48 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (second alteration in original)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *343). Inconve-
niences could include the cost or time of a jury trial. See id.
49 See White, supra note 44, at 10-11. For more detail on the English cases that im-
pacted the colonial Framers of the Bill of Rights, see id. at 5-14.
50 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 713 & n.4 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002).
51 See id. at 713 n.4.
52 See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REv. 283,
328 (2008).
53 See id. at 328-29 (discussing the political incentives for judges in "death states" to
support the death penalty). Note, however, that this effect may be exaggerated; voters may
hold judges less politically accountable for imposing the death penalty than legislators and
prosecutors in the same jurisdiction. See id.
54 See id. at 328-30.
55 See id. at 294-95, 330. Political pandering may also affect federal judges; although
they do not have to run for state or local office, the Senate selects for pro-death-penalty
2013] 1251
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Certain states allow judges to override a jury's sentencing recom-
mendation and impose the death penalty.5 6 Death penalty statistics
from Alabama provide one example of how judges are likely to adopt
a stance favoring death.5 7 In Alabama, capital overrides are common.
Over twenty percent of Alabama's death row population arrived on
death row after a judge overrode a jury sentence for life imprison-
ment.5 8 This situation suggests that judges in Alabama are generally
comfortable sentencing a defendant to death despite a jury's recom-
mendation that the death penalty should not be imposed. One possi-
ble explanation for this discrepancy between the judge and jury is that
although jurors are hesitant to sentence a defendant to death when
they have a lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt and find it
"preferable to err on the side of mercy," judges may be hardened to
these doubts and therefore less likely to respond to them. 5 9
The unique structure of capital sentencing procedure causes
these differences to have more impact. Sentencing, whether by jury
or judge, operates differently than the guilt decision phase. In the
guilt phase, the prosecutor seeks to establish facts for each element of
the charged crime to prove to the fact finder beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime.6 0 The sentencing
phase, on the other hand, requires moral judgment.6 1 In the death
eligibility stage of sentencing, the sentencer must first find an aggra-
vating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, but the presence of an ag-
gravating factor alone cannot justify capital punishment.6 2 Rather, in
the death selection stage, the sentencer also considers the defendant's
background and any mitigating factors, making an individualized as-
sessment of culpability based on the circumstances of the crime and
judges in the confirmation process, where Senators may question judicial appointees for
being "soft" on the death penalty. See id. at 329-30.
56 See EQUALJUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA: JUDGE OVERRIDE 6-7
(2011), available at http://www.eji.org/files/Override.Report.pdf (citing Alabama, Dela-
ware, and Florida as states with judicial override).
57 See id. at 11-13.
58 See id. at 10.
59 See Michael L. Radelet, Rejecting the jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Rorida,
18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1409, 1428 (1985) (explaining whyjudges might be more likely than
juries to sentence defendants to death). But see Michael L. Radelet, OverridingJury Sentenc-
ing Recommendations in Florida Capital Cases: An Update and Possible Half-Requiem, 2011 MIcH.
ST. L. REv. 793, 796-804, 812-15 (citing data demonstrating that only Alabama judges
commonly impose death where juries have recommended life and where judges can over-
ride the jury's recommendation of life).
60 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that due process requires
that each element of a charged crime be proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
61 See Bowers et al., supra note 41, at 416.
62 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (holding a mandatory
death penalty unconstitutional).
[Vol. 98:12451252
2013] PLEADING GUILTY TO DEATH 1253
other factors that could prescribe mercy.63 When a judge conducts
sentencing, only one person undertakes this moral balancing. A jury
sentencing, by contrast, requires that each of twelve individual jurors
make a moral determination about the defendant's personal culpabil-
ity and need for punishment, in line with the community's values. 64
In theory, a jury provides a fairer determination of moral culpability
because it relies on several individuals instead of just one.65
The Supreme Court affirmed the importance of allowing twelve
individuals to determine a capital defendant's sentence in Wiggins v.
Smith.6 6 Wiggins held counsel ineffective where counsel did not pre-
sent compelling mitigating evidence in a penalty-phase hearing, not-
ing that even though all twelve jurors might not have been swayed,
"there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have
struck a different balance."6 7 A jury's decision to impose the death
penalty must be unanimous, and this requirement safeguards against
misapplication. 6 8 The "at least one juror" theory imparts the impor-
tance of the jury's wisdom and intuitions, especially when compared
to theories vesting sole authority in one judge.
63 See Bowers et al., supra note 41, at 416-17. This calculation has some variation
depending on whether the state is a weighing or nonweighing state. In weighing states,
jurors are limited to a specific, itemized list of aggravating circumstances in both the eligi-
bility and selection phases, and in nonweighing states, jurors are not limited by a specific
set of factors and may consider all relevant mitigating and aggravating circumstances. See
Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 216-17 (2006).
64 See Bowers et al., supra note 41, at 417.
65 Note, however, that some elements of capital jury selection may make the jury un-
representative of the community's views on the death penalty. See Acker & Lanier, supra
note 34, at 106-07 ("Ironically, statutes that provide for jury sentencing in death[ ]penalty
cases .. . are significantly undercut by other laws that operate to selectively exclude certain
community members from participating."); see, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173,
177-78 (1986) (holding that "death-qualified" or "conviction-prone"juries do not violate a
capital defendant's constitutional right to a fair cross-section jury). But cf Turner v. Mur-
ray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding that a capital defendant has the right to cross-
examine prospective jurors in voir dire about the jurors' racial biases).
66 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
67 Id. at 537-38 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Piper v. Weber, 771
N.W.2d 352, 359 (S.D. 2009) ("The fact that one juror has the potential to save a defen-
dant's life cannot be underplayed."); cf Am. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF VA., UNEQUAL, UN-
FAIR AND IRREVERSIBLE: THE DEATH PENALTY IN VIRGINIA 17 (2000), available at http://www.
acluva.org/publications/deathpenaltystudy.pdf (discussing the Virginia case of Dwayne Al-
len Wright, in which three jurors would have voted for life had they been presented with
mitigating evidence, and noting that if "one juror voted for a life sentence ... Wright
would not have been sentenced to death").
68 See, e.g., Borchardt v. State, 786 A.2d 631, 660 (Md. 2001) (noting that the death
penalty cannot be imposed as long as a single juror concludes that mitigating evidence
outweighs aggravating evidence).
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B. The Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment Jury Sentencing
Jurisprudence
Although several states require that a jury make the ultimate sen-
tencing determination of life or death, the Supreme Court has not
held that the Constitution mandates jury sentencing. In the founda-
tional modern American death penalty cases, Furman v. Georgia69 and
Gregg v. Georgia,70 the Court made no clear pronouncement about
who the sentencer should be in a capital case, even though it directed
state legislatures to provide sufficient channeling and guidance to
whichever body ultimately made findings of fact.7 1 After Gregg, the
Court implicitly condoned the constitutionality of judge sentencing
and then officially ratified it in cases that followed.
The first approval came in 1984 when the Court decided Spaziano
v. Florida.72 Florida's capital punishment scheme used the jury in an
advisory capacity; the judge determined death eligibility and selec-
tion.73 Despite a holding in Bullington v. MissourI7 4 that seemed to
suggest that capital sentencing should guarantee the same procedural
protections as those afforded in other criminal guilt phase proceed-
ings (such as protection against double jeopardy, which was at issue in
Bullington),75 the Court in Spaziano declined to extend this protection
to the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee.76 The Court reasoned
that, although a capital sentencing has many unique features separat-
ing it from other criminal sentencings, "despite its unique aspects, a
capital sentencing proceeding involves the same fundamental issue in-
volved in any other sentencing proceeding-a determination of the
69 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
70 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
71 See id. at 206-07; Acker & Lanier, supra note 34, at 105. Setting the tone for mod-
ern death penalty jurisprudence, Furman and Gregg and their associated cases established
that a death penalty scheme satisfies Eighth Amendment constitutional concerns if the
scheme reduces the risk of arbitrariness by limiting discretion while still ensuring that a
capital defendant has an individualized sentencing by taking into account the defendant's
character and record. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. Theoretically, these guarantees ensure
that a defendant who receives a death sentence deserves that sentence and that a rational
jury has imposed the sentence without prejudice. At the same time, courts will afford a
state legislature deference in developing a death penalty scheme. So long as a statute
fulfills the minimal requirements of guided discretion and individualized consideration of
the circumstances of the offense and the defendant's character, the statute will likely be
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 188 (citingJustice Potter Stewart's
concurrence in Furman, which underscored the importance of reducing arbitrariness);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (emphasizing the importance of
individualized sentencing in striking down North Carolina's mandatory death sentence);
Acker & Lanier, supra note 34, at 96.
72 468 U.S. 447 (1984), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
73 See id. at 451-52.
74 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
75 See id. at 446-47.
76 See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 458-59.
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appropriate punishment to be imposed on an individual."77 The dis-
sent argued that contemporary standards of decency fell againstjudge
sentencing.78 In particular, the dissent emphasized the importance of
the jury as the voice of the community, using historical and current
evidence of the prevalence of jury sentencing in the United States.79
Without jury sentencing, the dissenters argued, a capital punishment
scheme violates the Eighth Amendment because it "creates the risk
that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may
call for a less severe penalty."80
In 1989, the Court upheld the Spaziano decision against a chal-
lenge in Hildwin v. Floida.81 The majority noted that traditionally a
judge determines the sentence in a criminal case and ultimately con-
cluded that "the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific
findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made
by the jury. "82
One year later, in Walton v. Arizona, the Court again affirmed the
sufficiency of a judge's finding of fact in capital sentencing.8 3 Ari-
zona's death penalty statute entrusted death eligibility determinations
to the judge alone.84 After the trial jury returned a guilty verdict, the
prosecution and defense presented evidence of aggravating and miti-
gating factors directly to the judge, who made the ultimate weighing
calculation to determine death eligibility.85 Unlike the Florida death
penalty statute, which paid lip service to a jury determination by al-
lowing the jury an "advisory" function, the Arizona scheme never in-
cluded a jury in the sentencing determination. 6 The Court rejected
the petitioner's argument that a jury must find every fact necessary to
render a sentencing decision.87 Instead, the Court relied on prece-
dent from other cases, ultimately concluding that the Constitution did
not require that ajury find the existence of aggravating circumstances
that would elevate a defendant to death eligibility.88 The Court main-
tained its position that neither the Sixth Amendment nor the history
of criminal sentencing established a need for jury fact finding at sen-
77 Id. at 459.
78 See id. at 476-77, 484 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 See id.
80 Id. at 489 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
81 490 U.S. 638, 639-41 (1989) (per curiam), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002).
82 Id. at 640-41.
83 497 U.S. 639, 647-48 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
84 See id. at 643-44.
85 See id. at 645-47.
86 See id. at 648.
87 See id. at 647-49.
88 See id.
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tencing.89 Justice John Paul Stevens's dissent traced the Sixth Amend-
ment jury right to the Founding, when the jury was crucial to factual
determinations of life and death.90 Justice Stevens urged the Court to
stop "distorting" the function of jury fact finding in sentencing and
change course from the "unfortunate decision[ ]" in Spaziano. 1
A decade later, the Court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey called
the Spaziano/ Walton line of cases into question. In Apprendi, the Court
held that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury[ ] and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."92 Specifically, the Court held
that New Jersey's hate-crimes statute violated the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments because it permitted the judge to make addi-
tional findings at sentencing-after the jury made findings at the guilt
phase of the trial-using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
that would increase the defendant's penalty beyond the maximum
that the jury could impose. 3 Apprendi marked a new era in sentenc-
ing, shifting power away from judges.94
However, the Apprendi majority specifically insulated capital cases
from the announced rule, holding that Walton and the cases approv-
ing judge discretion in capital sentencing still controlled.95 Thus, the
Sixth Amendment guaranteed a right to have a jury determine all
facts relevant to an increased sentence but did not extend the defini-
tion of facts that are relevant as elements of a crime to ajudge's ruling
on the presence of aggravating factors. The contrary holdings of Wal-
ton and Apprendi could not stand unreconciled for long. In his Ap-
prendi concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas acknowledged that the
Court would need to address the issue in the future: "Whether this
89 See id.; Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and the Jury's
Role in Capital Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 540 (2011).
90 See Walton, 497 U.S. at 712-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 See id. at 713-14.
92 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
9 See id. at 492-97.
94 See Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing Guidelines: Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 87 IowA L. REv. 775, 800 (2002) (noting that Apprendi marked a shift in the sentenc-
ing landscape, but also arguing that power actually shifted from judges to prosecutors, who
could include sentencing enhancements in plea agreements).
95 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Walton did approve a
scheme by which a judge, rather than a jury, determines an aggravating fact that makes a
convict eligible for the death penalty, and thus eligible for a greater punishment.... But
that scheme exists in a unique context, for . . . [w]e have interposed a barrier between a
jury finding of a capital crime and a court's ability to impose capital punishment."). In
contrast, the Apprendi dissenters cited Walton as clearly controlling given the higher life-or-
death stakes of the death penalty versus a term of imprisonment. See id. at 537 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) ("If a State can remove from the jury a factual determination that makes the
difference between life and death . . , it is inconceivable why a State cannot do the same
with respect to a factual determination that results in only a 10-year increase in the maxi-
mum sentence . . . .").
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distinction between capital crimes and all others ... is sufficient to put
the former outside the rule," he wrote, "is a question for another
day."96
That day came just two years later, when the Court resolved the
conflicting holdings of Apprendi and Walton in Ring v. Arizona.97 The
Court overruled Walton, holding that "Apprendi's reasoning is irrecon-
cilable with Walton's holding" because the additional facts found by a
judge as aggravating factors were actually elements of the crime.98 As
such, "[c]apital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants . . .
are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legisla-
ture conditions an increase in their maximum punishment."99
Although death selection could remain within the judge's discre-
tion, Ring required that a jury determine death eligibility. After his
guilt-phase jury trial, defendant Timothy Ring could not have received
a death sentence without additional factual findings; life imprison-
ment was the maximum sentence legally possible based on the evi-
dence presented at trial.100 The Supreme Court defined any factual
findings necessary for death eligibility as elements of the greater of-
fense and thus subject to the Sixth Amendment jury right established
in Apprendi.'0 The Court also held that the Sixth Amendment re-
quired that the jury determine these additional facts beyond a reason-
able doubt and not by a lower burden.102 Ring established the capital
defendant's right to a jury determination of aggravating factors at the
death eligibility stage.' 03 However, the judge could still conduct death
selection after the jury found the defendant death eligible.
Some difficulty in interpreting Ring remains, mostly because state
legislatures have broad discretion in drafting their capital sentencing
statutes.104 In their evaluation of state compliance with Ring, Sam
Kamin and Justin Marceau discovered that many states take advantage
of a fluid definition of what constitutes "fact finding" to maintain
judge determinations of death eligibility and sentencing. In examples
96 Id. at 523 (Thomas, J., concurring).
97 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002).
98 Id. at 588-89, 602, 605.
99 Id. at 589.
100 See id. at 591-92, 597. In Ring's case, the trial judge found that Ring had "commit-
ted the offense in expectation of receiving something of 'pecuniary value'" and that "the
offense was committed 'in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner."' Id. at
594-95 (citations omitted).
101 See id. at 609.
102 See Acker & Lanier, supra note 34, at 106.
103 See Bowers et al., supra note 41, at 416 n.6 ("Ring... holds that statutory aggravat-
ing factors in capital sentencing are . . . factual elements of the crime that must be deter-
mined by jury rather than judge in accord with the Sixth Amendment. As such, they are
presumably subject to the requirement that they be found beyond a reasonable doubt in
capital cases.").
104 See supra discussion at note 71.
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from four death penalty states, Kamin and Marceau isolated ways in
which states avoid jury determinations of what should be facts under
Ring.1 0 5 For example, the Florida State Supreme Court held that miti-
gating evidence is not a fact-finding endeavor within the jury's prov-
ince.106 The Tenth Circuit agreed, holding:
[T]he jury's decision that the aggravating factors outweigh the miti-
gating factors is not a finding of fact. Instead, it is a highly subjec-
tive, largely moral judgment regarding the punishment that a
particular person deserves . . . . The Apprendi/Ring rule applies by
its terms only to findings of fact, not to moral judgments. 107
Kamin and Marceau argue that "this position is largely indefensible"
given the body of scholarship on what constitutes a finding of law ver-
sus a finding of fact.108 Limiting fact finding to "the who, when, what,
and where" is unrealistic; a jury must often make determinations
about concepts that are not normally considered to be "facts" but that
are clearly within the jury's fact-finding duty, including questions of
causation, culpability, and reasonableness. 109 Analogously, aggravat-
ing factors, while not "facts" in the traditional sense, nonetheless fall
within the jury's fact-finding domain.110
As a result, Ring has not prompted much change in state capital
sentencing statutes.11 Ring's limited holding means that states can
easily work within its minimal requirements. However, a more diffi-
cult question arises when defendants waive their Sixth Amendment
rights. Some defendants may procedurally waive their Sixth Amend-
ment Ring right to have a jury determine death eligibility.112 Others
may believe that they have a guaranteed right to a jury sentencing
though they actually do not because of Ring's limitations. Pleading
guilty is one means by which defendants waive their right to a jury
sentencing. In the next Part, I will explore why pleading guilty creates
a tension for the defendant's Sixth Amendment right as established in
Ring.
105 See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 89, at 530, 551-52.
106 See id. at 558-59 (citing Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002) (per
curiam)).
107 Id. at 559-60 (quoting United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1107 (10th Cir.
2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108 Id. at 561 & nn.119-20.
109 Id. at 561-63 (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 229, 235 (1985)) (internal quotations marks omitted). For an example of this reason-
ing from tort law, see id. at 562-63.
110 See id. at 563-64.
III See id. at 560-61 & n.118.
112 See Maurita Elaine Horn, Comment, Confessional Stipulations: Protecting Waiver of
Constitutional Rights, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 225, 225 (1994).
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II
A PROCEDURAL CHALLENGE: DEATI ELIGIBILITY FOR
PLEA BARGAINS
The plea bargain is a "striking" feature of the American criminal
courts and a "[d]istinctively American [p]ractice." 1 3 Ninety-four per-
cent of those sentenced as felony offenders in state court plead guilty
to the crimes with which they are charged. 114 The criminal justice
system relies on guilty pleas to function efficiently and effectively. Ide-
ally, the guilty plea benefits all involved.
At its core, a plea bargain is a contract between the state and the
defendant that the defendant will plead guilty in exchange for a lesser
sentence.115 Theoretically, the parties bargain in the "shadows of tri-
als," with an eye toward the expected outcome if the case went
through a full trial before a jury.'1 6 The plea bargain reduces the
large caseload facing judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, thus
conserving judicial resources and saving taxpayers' money.' 17 Moreo-
ver, some believe that having fewer plea bargains would result in a
lower standard of justice because resources would necessarily be
spread thinner." 8 In exchange, defendants who acknowledge their
guilt receive lesser sentences, may relieve their consciences, and can
begin serving their sentences sooner." 9 In most criminal trials,
judges will sentence the defendant to the agreed term. However, the
judge is not required to do so, and the sentence ultimately imposed
on a defendant might diverge from that agreed upon by the defense
attorney and the prosecutor.120
Capital defendants face special challenges when pleading guilty.
Prosecutors have been criticized for using the threat of the death pen-
113 MARY E. VOGEL, COERCION TO COMPROMISE: PLEA BARGAINING, THE COURTS AND THE
MAKING OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 3 (2007).
114 SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, Bu-
REAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006-STATISTICAL TABLES
1 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc6st.pdf.
115 See Timothy Sandefur, In Defense ofPlea Bargaining, REGULATION, Fall 2003, at 28, 28.
116 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Tial, 117 HARV. L. REv.
2463, 2464-68 (2004) (explaining the theory behind the "shadow-of-trial" model but argu-
ing that parties sometimes diverge from this model in practice).
117 See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment,
Should We Really "Ban"Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY
L.J. 753, 765-67 (1998); Timothy Lynch, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, REGULATION, Fall
2003, at 24, 24 (discussing the cost of jury trials to taxpayers and the ways in which plea
bargaining decreases the workload of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys).
118 See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71; Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargain-
ing Process, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 439, 440 (1971).
119 See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71; Lynch, supra note 117, at 24; White, supra note 118, at
440.
120 See White, supra note 118, at 443-46, 448 (detailing judges' practices for accepting
guilty pleas in New York and Philadelphia).
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alty as a bargaining chip in plea negotiations.1 2 ' "[P]lea bargaining in
the shadow of death" allows prosecutors to use the threat of the death
penalty to incentivize defendants to waive their right to trial by plead-
ing guilty.12 2 Defendants may also face coercion from judges who
might abandon their positions as impartial moderators of the criminal
trial and instead inject their preference for a plea bargain in order to
preserve judicial economy.12 3 Judges can also disrupt the efficiency of
the plea bargain system if they sentence defendants to harsher penal-
ties than requested by prosecutors. 124
Despite the procedural difficulties facing capital defendants,
pleading guilty remains present in, and often a crucial part of, capital
murder prosecution. In Brady v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that guilty pleas are not invalid simply because defendants en-
tered them with an eye toward avoiding the death penalty. 25 The
Court acknowledged that guilty pleas should be scrutinized because
defendants waive their constitutional rights but concluded that so
long as a guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and made with "sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences," the
use of a plea bargain is acceptable and in fact should be encouraged
for reasons ofjudicial economy.126 Essentially, the Court believed that
the threat of the death penalty did not restrict the voluntariness of a
capital defendant's plea bargaining to an unconstitutional degree. 127
Unable to challenge the voluntariness of guilty pleas in capital
cases, many defense attorneys have embraced them as a strategy to
avoid death sentences for their clients, making their use even more
prevalent.12 8 The American Bar Association Guidelines require de-
fense attorneys for capital defendants to consider seeking negotiated
pleas for their clients. 129 Those attorneys who pursue plea bargains as
a way to avoid the death penalty express confidence that the negoti-
121 See id. at 439.
122 SeeJoseph L. Hoffmann et al., Plea Bargaining in the Shadow ofDeath, 69 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 2313, 2313, 2350 (2001). In response to these concerns, New York appellate courts
effectively banned all plea bargaining in capital cases, rationalizing that all capital defend-
ants should have their day in court. See id. at 2313. However, the New York Court of
Appeals rendered this ban moot when it held New York's death penalty statute unconstitu-
tional in 2004. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 367 (N.Y. 2004).
123 See White, supra note 118, at 452-53.
124 See id. at 462-63 (noting that defendants become less likely to plead guilty when
judges impose harsher sentences than those initially agreed upon with the prosecution).
125 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
126 See id. at 748, 752-53.
127 See id. at 750-52, 755.
128 See generally WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATrOR-
NEYS IN CAPITAL CASES 145-71 (2006) (discussing the plea-bargaining tactics of several ex-
perienced defense attorneys). This strategy assumes that avoiding a death sentence is the
ultimate goal and is in the client's best interests. See id. at 170-71.
129 See id. at 145 (citing AM. BAR Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PER-
FORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 10.9.1, at 91 (2003)).
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ated settlement of the charges increases their chances of saving their
client's lives.130 Many prosecutors, even those who consistently seek
the death penalty for almost all capital crimes, will cut a deal for effi-
ciency reasons and because they recognize that a sentence of life with-
out parole protects the community and satisfies the state's interest in
finality.13 1 Even in jurisdictions with high execution rates, a defense
attorney can usually convince a prosecutor to work out a plea bargain
if the defense attorney can persuade the prosecutor that it will be ad-
vantageous to the government to avoid litigation. 32 Unfortunately,
however, a defendant who enters a plea intelligently and with the ad-
vice of counsel waives future challenges (so long as the state does not
make a misrepresentation or engage in other impermissible conduct
in the plea negotiations), which raises broader issues about ineffective
assistance of counsel in this context. 33
Capital defendants face unique consequences because of the
structure of capital sentencing. Although no clear constitutional right
requires that a jury conduct capital sentencing, many states provide
juries at this stage because of the uniquely harsh and final nature of
the death penalty.13 4 However, the question of who should make the
eligibility determination in the penalty proceedings arises after a de-
fendant pleads guilty in front of a judge without a jury verdict at the
guilt phase. Often, states that normally allow for jury sentencing will
provide the defendant with the option to have a jury sentencing, but
with default judge sentencing and no notice of an alternative, defend-
ants will often unknowingly waive their jury right.135
Capital defendants can lose another important right, however, if
they cannot enter a guilty plea. The use of a guilty plea to show ac-
ceptance of responsibility can have a great impact on a defendant's
jury sentence. Studies of capital juries have found that lack of re-
morse plays an enormous part in sentencing a defendant to death. 36
Acceptance of responsibility can strongly influence a jury to sentence
a defendant to life without parole rather than death. Notably, how-
ever, acceptance of responsibility is only likely to affect jurors if the
130 See id. at 146 (citing interviews with experienced capital defense attorneys).
131 See id. at 147-48.
132 See id. at 148.
133 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970); WHITE, supra note 128, at 171.
134 See supra Part I.B.
135 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 11, 2010 WL 3740551, at *11
(noting that the trial judge made no mention of the jury right at sentencing).
136 See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy,
Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1557-59 (1998); cf State v.
Louviere, 833 So. 2d 885, 894 (La. 2002) ("[D]enying a defendant the choice to plead
guilty arguably would impermissibly deprive the defendant, per the federal Constitution, of
his strategic choice to acknowledge his crime and thereby appear remorseful before his
jury.").
2013] 1261
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
defendant expresses it before the penalty proceedings.13 7 Jurors' atti-
tudes, therefore, seem to evidence that accepting responsibility early
in a trial will likely change the defendant's sentence, even though stra-
tegically it might be to the defendant's disadvantage. Furthermore,
many capital defendants do not wish to put their families or the family
of the victim through the "spectacle and expense" of a lengthy, public
trial.'38 For these reasons, the right to plead guilty is an essential pro-
tection for criminal defendants.
If defendants do not receive a jury sentencing after the guilt
phase, a costly alternative called the "slow guilty plea" might become
more prevalent. With a slow guilty plea, the defendant pleads not
guilty, and a full trial follows. However, the defense chooses not to
present any evidence or to contest the prosecution's evidence.139 In
effect, the defendant pleads guilty, but going through a trial preserves
the defendant's rights that would otherwise be waived after a guilty
plea. 140 Prosecutors and defendants alike will suffer undesirable costs
if slow guilty pleas become standard. The state will not save any re-
sources because it still must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in a trial.14' The defendant will not have the
opportunity to accept responsibility and must instead go through the
motions of a trial, although he or she has essentially conceded guilt.
This least favorable option will likely find increasing favor among de-
fendants if they are stripped of basic constitutional rights like the jury
determination of death eligibility at sentencing.142
Under Ring, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the
right to a jury for any fact finding that increases the maximum sen-
tence. 43 When defendants plead guilty, they essentially concede the
factual elements of their crimes. After this point, a judge elevates the
137 See Sundby, supra note 136, at 1586-87 (quotingjurors who did not believe a defen-
dant's acceptance of responsibility was genuine when the defense presented the jurors with
the evidence at the penalty phase but not at the guilt phase of the trial, including, "[He]
testified and said he was sorry, but he didn't show it by his actions," and arguing that this
trial strategy leaves room for jurors to have a reasonable doubt (alteration in original)).
138 See Barry J. Fisher, judicial Suicide or Constitutional Autonomy? A Capital Defendant's
Right to Plead Guilty, 65 ALB. L. REv. 181, 200-01 (2001) (quoting United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570, 584 (1968)); see also People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 500 (Colo. 2007) (en
banc) ("[B]ecause trials of capital cases can be especially traumatic, some defendants are
compelled to enter guilty pleas so as to avoid the pain that the process inevitably will cause
to themselves, their families, or the victim's families." (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 750)).
139 See ArthurJohn Keeffe & Linda L. Castle, Browser, A.B.A.J., Sept. 1984, at 163, 165.
140 See id. For an example of case involving a slow guilty plea, see Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175, 180-84 (2004).
141 See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
142 Cf Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed., Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 2012, at SR5 (arguing that the criminal justice system will only be improved and crimi-
nal defendants will be better able to preserve their rights if they forego plea deals and
effectively stall the justice system).
143 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
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possible maximum sentence if the judge determines death eligibility.
Pleading guilty provides procedural and moral benefits to defendants,
but these benefits will not be realized if by entering a guilty plea a
defendant also forfeits certain constitutional rights. In the next Part
of this Note, I will examine Virginia's death penalty scheme and pro-
vide a specific example of how pleading guilty deprives defendants of
their constitutional rights. I will then discuss potential solutions to
this problem and explore the procedures by which defendants could
challenge a guilty plea at trial to establish their constitutional right.
III
CHALLENGING THE CAPITAL PLEA AND SENTENCING SCHEME
A. Pleading Guilty in Virginia
Virginia stands out as a leader among death penalty jurisdictions
in the United States. Since Gregg (decided in 1976),144 Virginia has
executed 109 death row inmates, second only to Texas.145 Virginia
quickly moves defendants from trial to execution; although states
take, on average, nine years to bring a defendant from sentencing to
execution, Virginia has completed this process in as few as five years in
some cases.146 Moreover, the murder statute in Virginia lists no fewer
than fifteen offenses that the legislature defines as capital murder.147
Prosecutorial discretion determines if the state will seek the death
penalty in an individual case. 148 Officially, Virginia reserves the death
penalty for "a very small number of extreme cases."' 49 Virginia Attor-
ney General Ken Cuccinelli has said that Virginia prosecutors "rarely
seek a death sentence unless the case involves overwhelming guilt and
is truly one of the worst of the worst." 50 Significant narrowing occurs
in the Virginia scheme: in the late 1990s, 215 murder arrests were for
capital offenses; 170 resulted in a capital murder indictment, 64 were
prosecuted as death eligible cases, 46 of these resulted in convictions,
144 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 153 (1976).
145 See Simon Rogers, Death Penalty Statistics from the US: Which State Executes the Most
People?, GUARDIAN DATABLOG (Sept. 21, 2011, 8:30 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/
datablog/2011/sep/21/death-penalty-statistics-us.
146 See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF VA., supra note 67, at 4; see also Frank Green, Path
to Execution Swifter, More Certain in Va., RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 2011, http://
www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2011/dec/04/tdmain0l-path-to-execution-swifter-more-
certain-in-ar-1512219 (citing arguments that the swift pace at which Virginia's death pen-
alty system moves may sacrifice certainty for efficiency).
147 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (2009).
148 See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF VA., supra note 67, at 8 ("The decision to seek
death in any given capital murder case is made by an individual prosecutor elected in the
jurisdiction where the murder took place.").
149 Id. at 8 (quoting Clark v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 784, 791 (4th Cir. 1979)).
150 Green, supra note 146.
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and 24 were sentenced to death.15 ' This data suggests that a great
degree of discretion must enter the sentencing process. 1 5 2 Anecdotal
evidence supports discrepancies in the exercise of this discretion.
One former Virginia prosecutor, William H. Fuller, sought the death
penalty in almost all death-eligible cases-"not just the worst cases"-
but other prosecutors did not deem many "egregious killers" death
eligible. 15
Virginia's statutory scheme intends to effect Furman and Gregg in-
dividualization and guided discretion. To enter death penalty consid-
eration, a defendant must first be convicted at the guilt phase of an
offense for which the death penalty can be imposed under the state's
capital murder statute.15 4 Next, at the eligibility phase, Virginia law
requires that the fact finder determine whether the prosecution has
proven the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable
doubt.15 5 After being found death eligible, the defendant enters the
selection phase.15 6 Virginia's death penalty scheme is nonweigh-
ing.157 This means that in the final selection phase, Virginia requires
that either the judge or ajury consider all aggravating and mitigating
factors and recommend a sentence of death or life imprisonment. 5 8
When a defendant pleads guilty, he or she loses access to many of
these procedural safeguards. Virginia law requires that a judge con-
duct all sentencing proceedings after a defendant pleads guilty.15 9
Thus, after pleading guilty to a crime that could qualify a defendant
for capital punishment, Virginia's default rule grants discretion to the
judge to rule on both death eligibility and selection. This procedure
runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment. Ring v. Arizona requires that a
jury find any fact that can increase the maximum sentence, most nota-
bly in the death eligibility phase.o6 0 Often, defendants unknowingly
waive their right to ajury determination of death eligibility when they
plead guilty.161 Advocates of Virginia's death penalty scheme argue
151 JoINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM'N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF
VIRGINIA'S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, at ii (2002), available at http://jlarc.virginia.
gov/reports/Rpt274.pdf.
152 See Green, supra note 146 (alluding to research suggesting that factors such as
whether a community is rural or suburban plays a role in whether prosecutors seek the
death penalty).
153 Id.
154 See VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-31 (2009).
155 See id. § 19.2-264.4(C) (2008).
156 See id. § 19.2-264.2; Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998) (defining "eli-
gibility" and "selection").
157 See VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-264.2.
158 See id.
159 See id. § 19.2-257 ("Upon a plea of guilty in a felony case ... the court shall hear
and determine the case without the intervention of a jury ...
160 See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
161 See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
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that the stringent procedures for death sentences encourage prosecu-
tors to seek guilty pleas; 62 as applied, however, the scheme seems to
have the opposite effect.
Teresa Lewis's sentencing provides one example of how Vir-
ginia's death penalty scheme may cause defendants to unknowingly
waive their constitutional right to a jury determination of death eligi-
bility. Teresa entered a guilty plea for several reasons. First, she ac-
cepted responsibility1 63 and avoided a long, costly, and painful trial.
Her actions before and after the murders strongly implicated her in
the charged crimes. 164 Her coconspirator, Fuller, won the "race" to
the prosecutor's office, making a deal to cooperate in exchange for a
life sentence. 65 In pleading guilty, Teresa certainly hoped to avoid a
death sentence, both because her coconspirator had done the same
and because it seemed unlikely that a judge would sentence a woman
with an IQ of just above seventy to death. 1 66 When she entered her
guilty plea, Teresa did not know that ajury could determine her death
eligibility and perhaps consider mitigating evidence that could fall
against finding any aggravating factors. Teresa's counsel informed
her that if she pled guilty, "the [j]udge and not ajury" would sentence
her.'6 7 During the plea proceedings, the court also failed to notify
Teresa that she had a constitutional right to a jury determination of
death eligibility. 6 8 At Teresa's sentencing, the judge found that she
had acted with "depravity of mind."169 This factual finding established
the aggravating factor necessary for death eligibility.170 After making
this finding, the judge sentenced Teresa to death. 171
Teresa unknowingly waived her right to a jury determination of
death eligibility. Pleading guilty to her crime and accepting responsi-
bility, she did not knowingly accept death eligibility or a death sen-
tence. The case record does not mention any details of the deals
162 SeeJoiNT LEGISISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM'N OF THE VA. GEN. AsSEMBLY, supra
note 151, at 3, 56-57, 107 (noting that supporters of the death penalty argue that
"[w]ithout unequivocal convincing evidence . .. prosecutors will be more likely to seek a
plea agreement even if the nature of the crime supports the pursuit of the death penalty"
and defining "non-death" cases as including those in which the defendant pleads guilty).
163 See Grisham, supra note 8 ("[Lewis] confessed to the police, pled guilty to the judge
and for almost eight years has expressed profound remorse for her role in two murders.").
164 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 7-8, 2010 WL 3740551, at *7-8.
165 See Grisham, supra note 8; supra note 27 and accompanying text.
166 See Grisham, supra note 8; cf Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.5, 321 (2002)
(barring capital punishment for the mentally retarded and citing 2 KAPLAN & SADOCK'S
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 2952 (Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock
eds., 7th ed. 2000) to define mental retardation as "between 70 and 75 or lower").
167 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 11, 2010 WL 3740551, at *11.
168 See id.
169 See id. at 13, 2010 WL 3740551, at *13.
170 See id.
171 See id.
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between the prosecution, defense counsel, and the judge. One can
imagine a case, however, in which the record indicates that a defen-
dant pled guilty to a crime on the condition that she receive life im-
prisonment, only to have the judge later change his mind without
giving the defendant an opportunity to object. Virginia's death pen-
alty statutory scheme would not prevent this scenario. In both Teresa
Lewis's case and this hypothetical scenario, the defendant provides
the state a benefit-efficiency and the conservation of resources-and
accepts moral and criminal responsibility. In return, the defendant
receives a death sentence.
Capital defendants often benefit when ajury, rather than ajudge,
conducts fact finding and makes the ultimate moral judgments in
their cases because defendants are more likely to receive death
sentences from a judge than from a jury.1 72 As the Virginia system
stands, to preserve the jury right, a defendant must engage in a slow
guilty plea.173 In a slow guilty plea situation, the historical benefits
provided by a jury as the best outlet for the community's interest
would apply.174 Additionally, the prosecution would hold a much
heavier burden; rather than convincing just one judge, the prosecutor
would have the burden of convincing each member of a twelve-person
jury. 75 In Teresa Lewis's case, for example, ajury might have found
differently on the question of death eligibility given the mitigating evi-
dence in her favor. Teresa's guilty plea and acceptance of responsibil-
ity, her borderline mental illness, and the culpability of her
triggermen coconspirators would all have played a part in this
determination.
If a state wishes to encourage guilty pleas as institutional policy, it
must guarantee that defendants can have ajury for death eligibility-
or at least inform defendants of this right before they effectively waive
it.
B. Resolving Guilty Pleas and the Sixth Amendment
Virginia's capital scheme effectively waives defendants' jury rights
when they plead guilty to murder. 76 Recent scholarship has focused
on unconstitutional denials of defendants' jury rights. For example,
South Carolina Code section 16-3-20 denies a defendant who pleads
guilty to capital murder the right to a jury sentencing. 77 But Vir-
ginia's statute and similar statutes in other states reside in a greyer
172 See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 154-72 and accompanying text.
177 See Thomas W. Traxler, Jr., Comment, Reconciling the South Carolina Death Penalty
Statute with the Sixth Amendment, 60 S.C. L. REv. 1031, 1031-32 (2009).
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area. Under these schemes, defendants are not outright denied ajury
sentencing; instead, the statute makes it substantially more likely that
defendants will unknowingly waive their jury right. This is especially
true where the practice, like that in Virginia, allows the judge to pro-
ceed to the sentencing without any additional notification to the
defendant. 78
Some basic changes to the plea procedure would prevent un-
knowing waiver and ensure that Virginia follows Ring, thus preserving
the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, the utility of the guilty plea,
and fundamental fairness. A jury determination of death eligibility
should be the default after a plea to an offense that could qualify a
defendant for death. This measure would honor the defendant's
Sixth Amendment guarantee to a jury fact finding of any element that
increases the possible maximum sentence while still encouraging effi-
ciency by foregoing the trial and moving straight to sentencing. At
that point, both parties could present evidence of aggravating and
mitigating factors to a twelve-person jury. The jury would then con-
duct any fact finding necessary to ensure it has found the presence of
an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant
could still waive this requirement at any time and allow for complete
judicial discretion for both eligibility and selection. Judge determina-
tion as the default sentencing procedure lends itself to abuse of the
defendant's constitutional rights either through ineffective assistance
of counsel or a hurried plea bargain. A waiver of constitutional rights,
however, is permissible so long as the judge notifies the defendant of
the consequences of waiving the right to a jury.179 Judge notification
thus becomes essential to ensuring that death sentencing proceeds
constitutionally. 0
Although not constitutionally mandated, allowing the death-eligi-
bility jury to sit for the selection phase as well would strengthen the
individualization dimension of Virginia's death penalty scheme. A
jury determination at sentencing would ensure that the death penalty
only applies to the most egregious crimes, a goal that is important to
Virginia's death penalty system. 1 If the state kept the death-eligibil-
ity jury to sit for the selection stage, it would incur no extra cost. The
178 See discussion supra Part III.A.
179 Cf Horn, supra note 112, at 225-26 (noting that the Supreme Court has mandated
that trial courts inform defendants of their rights before they plead guilty, in addition to
requiring that the trial court determine whether the defendant is knowingly pleading
guilty to the charged crimes).
180 The judge is in the best position to notify the defendant of his or her rights, as
there is no particularized unconstitutional statute in Virginia.
181 See JoINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM'N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, supra
note 151, at 9-10 (reserving the death penalty for "the most atrocious or egregious crimes,
consistent with the intent of the legislature").
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parties would not need to go through voir dire again. Nor would the
jury need to look at additional evidence or even take more time for
deliberation. After finding an aggravating circumstance that would
make the defendant death eligible, the jury could determine the pres-
ence of aggravating and mitigating factors and make a selection deci-
sion. The jury plays an important role at sentencing, representing the
community's morals and values, and sentencing by jury would allow
the capital defendant to have an unbiased hearing on aggravating and
mitigating evidence. Requiring the prosecution to convince all twelve
jurors to vote for death will ensure a procedural safeguard against sen-
tencing to death those defendants who do not truly represent the
worst, most heinous cases in the opinion of the community.
Virginia would not be alone in separating a guilty plea in the guilt
phase from ajury sentencing in the penalty phase in order to preserve
the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Although Virginia's courts
continue to affirm that their capital murder statute complies with
Ring,82 other state courts have held that a state statute that allows a
judge to conduct sentencing in a plea proceeding does not comply
with the Sixth Amendment.a 3 In 2007, the Colorado Supreme Court
held that the state's death penalty statute unconstitutionally "link[ed]
the waiver of a defendant's jury sentencing right to his guilty plea."l 84
In particular, the court noted that when defendants plead guilty, they
do not waive all of their rights; rather, a guilty plea "only waives those
rights that are incompatible with a guilty plea."185 The court con-
cluded that a defendant's right to a jury at sentencing was not incom-
patible with entering a guilty plea because the plea would not make
the jury sentencing impossible.' 86 In 2009, the South Dakota Su-
preme Court affirmed the importance of a capital defendant's oppor-
tunity to have a jury sentencing.'87 The court held that where a
defendant did not understand the judge's instruction that the jury
would have to be unanimous in choosing death, the defendant did
not knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to a jury trial.'88 Vir-
182 See, e.g., Powell v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 537, 555 (Va. 2004) ("[T]he proce-
dures for .. . the penalty determination phase .. . continue to be fully in accord with the
Sixth Amendment due process concerns underpinning the decision in Ring."); see also VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2-19.2-264.5 (2008) (prescribing the procedures for capital cases in
Virginia state courts); VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:1, 3A-13(a), 3A:18 (setting forth the Virginia
Supreme Court rules of criminal practice and procedure).
183 See People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 491 (Colo. 2007) (en banc); Piper v. Weber,
771 N.W.2d 352, 359-60 (S.D. 2009). But see Missouri v. Nunley, 341 S.W.3d 611, 623 (Mo.
2011) (en banc) (holding that Ring does not preserve a right to jury determination of
death eligibility where a defendant entered a guilty plea).
184 See Montour, 157 P.3d at 491.
185 Id. at 499.
186 See id.
187 See Piper, 771 N.W.2d at 359-60.
188 See id. at 358-60.
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ginia and other states with invalid sentencing schemes would be fol-
lowing a growing trend in ensuring that their sentencing statutes
prevent unknowing waiver of the jury right.
C. Establishing a Constitutional Challenge
Ring established a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury
determination of death eligibility at the sentencing phase.189 Many
state legislatures, including Virginia's, have not recognized this right
in their statutory schemes and case law. Rather, these state legisla-
tures have determined that ajudge who makes factual findings regard-
ing death eligibility of a capital defendant does not elevate the level of
the crime or that the defendant waived the right to a jury determina-
tion when the defendant pled guilty.190 Establishing a constitutional
challenge to this fundamental deprivation presents unique difficul-
ties. First, it requires defendants to plead guilty and admit the factual
elements of their crimes. This admission presents a danger for sen-
tencing, as it limits the availability of defenses to present to ajury later
on. And, perhaps even more problematic, it does not prevent ajudge
from denying the request for a jury sentencing, leaving defendants
with an admission to the facts of the crime but without the ability to
appeal to a jury to explain the acceptance of responsibility.' 99
Defendants would more effectively challenge the existing sen-
tencing provisions and seek to have the court affirm their jury right by
limiting the scope of their guilty pleas. To successfully set up a consti-
tutional challenge, defendants would stand before trial and enter a
limited plea. The limited plea would only admit the facts necessary to
find the defendant guilty of murder. The defendant would not, how-
ever, admit any facts necessary to establish an aggravating circum-
stance and elevate the crime from murder to death-eligible murder.
The defendant's admissions would mirror the language in the statute
to ensure the limited scope of the plea. This strategy would leave the
question of death eligibility open and thus clearly establish an Ap-
prendi/Ring conflict. Should a judge unilaterally determine death eli-
gibility, that determination would elevate the crime beyond any of the
facts established for the defendant to that point, at which time the
court is constitutionally obligated to provide the defendant with ajury
to conduct any further fact finding.
Criminal defendants often use this strategy in other contexts. For
example, defendants frequently enter conditional or limited pleas to
preserve a claim for use in later motions. 192 Limiting the scope of the
189 See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
190 See supra discussion Part II1.A-B.
191 See supra discussion Part III.A-B.
192 See Guilty Pleas, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CIM. PROC. 381, 381-83 (2006).
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guilty plea could easily extend to the capital sentencing context. It
would not impose any additional requirements beyond the current
plea procedure.
Although a court and prosecutor might resist allowing a defen-
dant to enter a limited plea, this procedure would uniquely preserve a
limited set of facts-thus ensuring that a defendant does not plead to
the elements necessary for death-eligible murder. If a defendant did
not limit the facts admitted, a court could reason that the defendant
did not preserve the issue forjury determination, and the judge could
take control of the final penalty decision. The limited plea is worth
the challenges initial resistance might pose in the courtroom because
after entering a limited plea, a defendant will have a much higher
chance of succeeding on an Apprendi/Ring claim on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Cases like Teresa Lewis's illuminate the potential for procedural
unfairness where defendants plead guilty to death. The process impli-
cates two important rights. First, defendants risk unknowing waiver of
their right to have a jury determine death eligibility. This right has
strong historical roots and an empirical effect on defendants' receiv-
ing fair sentences. 93 Second, the process may erode the guilty plea.
Replacing guilty pleas with slow guilty pleas in order to preserve con-
stitutional rights removes any benefits the state may gain from a guilty
plea.'94 Virginia's statutory scheme does not properly account for de-
fendants' right to have a jury determine death eligibility after plead-
ing guilty, but simple changes to this scheme would ensure
preservation of the right while also benefitting the state by encourag-
ing guilty pleas. Perhaps the outcome of Teresa Lewis's case would
not have been different had a jury determined her death eligibility,
but, per the Sixth Amendment, she deserved a chance to convince at
least one juror that her crimes were not sufficiently aggravated to trig-
ger the death penalty. Future capital defendants should mount con-
stitutional challenges to Virginia's scheme during their own trials to
take advantage of their right to a jury determination before a death
sentencing.
193 See supra notes 45-65 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
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